IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Efficiency and equity impacts of rural land rental restrictions : evidence from India

  • Deininger, Klaus
  • Jin, Songqing
  • Nagarajan, Hari K.

Recognition of the potentially deleterious implications of inequality in opportunity originating in a skewed asset distribution has spawned considerable interest in land reforms. However, little attention has been devoted to fact that, in the longer term, the measures used to implement land reforms could negatively affect productivity. Use of state level data on rental restrictions, together with a nationally representative survey from India, suggests that, contrary to original intentions, rental restrictions negatively affect productivity and equity. The restrictions reduce the scope for efficiency-enhancing rental transactions that benefit poor producers. Simulations suggest that, by doubling the number of producers with access to land through rental, from about 15 million currently, liberalization of rental markets could have far-reaching impacts.

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/08/17/000158349_20070817085203/Rendered/PDF/wps4324.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by The World Bank in its series Policy Research Working Paper Series with number 4324.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 01 Aug 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4324
Contact details of provider: Postal: 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20433
Phone: (202) 477-1234
Web page: http://www.worldbank.org/
Email:


More information through EDIRC

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as in new window
  1. Besley, Timothy J. & Burgess, Robin, 2002. "Can Labour Regulation Hinder Economic Performance? Evidence from India," CEPR Discussion Papers 3260, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Garcia-Penalosa, Cecilia & Aghion, Philippe & Caroli, Eve, 1999. "Inequality and Economic Growth: The Perspective of the New Growth Theories," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/10091, Paris Dauphine University.
  3. Binswanger, Hans P. & Deininger, Klaus & Feder, Gershon, 1993. "Power, distortions, revolt, and reform in agricultural land relations," Policy Research Working Paper Series 1164, The World Bank.
  4. World Bank, 2007. "India : Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15791.
  5. Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, 1998. "Land reform, poverty reduction and growth : evidence from India," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2018, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  6. Abhijit Banerjee & Lakshmi Iyer, 2010. "History Institutions and Economic Performance: The Legacy of Colonial Land Tenure Systems in India," Working Papers id:2811, eSocialSciences.
  7. Coelli, T. J., 1995. "Recent Developments in Frontier Modelling and Efficiency Measurement," 1995 Conference (39th), February 14-16, 1995, Perth, Australia 148798, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
  8. Gyourko, Joseph & Linneman, Peter, 1990. "Rent controls and rental housing quality: A note on the effects of New York City's old controls," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 398-409, May.
  9. Abhijit V. Banerjee & Paul J. Gertler & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2002. "Empowerment and Efficiency: Tenancy Reform in West Bengal," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 239-280, April.
  10. Basu, Kaushik & Emerson, Patrick M., 2000. "The Economics of Tenancy Rent Control," Working Papers 00-04, Cornell University, Center for Analytic Economics.
  11. Jonathan Conning & James A. Robinson, 2005. "Property Rights and the Political Organization of Agriculture," Economics Working Paper Archive at Hunter College 405, Hunter College Department of Economics.
  12. Michael R. Carter & Yang Yao, 2002. "Local versus Global Separability in Agricultural Household Models: The Factor Price Equalization Effect of Land Transfer Rights," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 84(3), pages 702-715.
  13. Munch, Jakob Roland & Svarer, Michael, 2002. "Rent control and tenancy duration," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 542-560, November.
  14. Kaushik Basu & Patrick M. Emerson, 2003. "Efficiency Pricing, Tenancy Rent Control and Monopolistic Landlords," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 70(278), pages 223-232, 05.
  15. Klaus Deininger, 2003. "Land Policies for Growth and Poverty Reduction," World Bank Publications, The World Bank, number 15125.
  16. Deininger, Klaus & Jin, Songqing, 2005. "The potential of land rental markets in the process of economic development: Evidence from China," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 78(1), pages 241-270, October.
  17. Frisvold, George B., 1994. "Does supervision matter? Some hypothesis tests using Indian farm-level data," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 217-238, April.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4324. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Roula I. Yazigi)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.