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Determinants and Consequences of Land Sales Market Participation: Panel Evidence from India

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  • Deininger, Klaus W.
  • Jin, Songqing
  • Nagarajan, Hari K.

Abstract

Although opinions on impacts of land market transfers are sharply divided, few studies explore the welfare- and productivity impact of land markets on a larger scale. We use a large Indian panel spanning almost 20 years, together with a climatic shock (rainfall) indicator, to assess the productivity- and equity-impact of market-mediated land transfers (sale and purchase) as compared to non-market ones (inheritance). While frequent shocks increase land market activity, an effect that is mitigated by presence of safety nets and banks- land sales markets improved productivity and helped purchasers, many of them formerly landless, to accumulate non-land assets and significantly enhance their welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Deininger, Klaus W. & Jin, Songqing & Nagarajan, Hari K., 2007. "Determinants and Consequences of Land Sales Market Participation: Panel Evidence from India," 2007 Annual Meeting, July 29-August 1, 2007, Portland, Oregon 9824, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:aaea07:9824
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.9824
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    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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