Supervision of financial conglomerates : the case of Chile
The author describes the presence of financial conglomerates and assesses the extent to which the risks they introduce to the Chilean financial system are mitigated by existing oversight arrangements (and at what cost). In particular, he questions whether the current silo-based supervisory framework, which has served the system fairly well until now, can continue unchanged given growing inter-linkages in the financial system. The author proposes a high-level short- and medium-term supervisory reform agenda that addresses identified vulnerabilities relating to financial conglomerates and continues the migration from a rules-oriented to a risk-based supervisory approach that has gradually been taking place in Chile in recent years.
|Date of creation:||01 Mar 2005|
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- Iman van Lelyveld & Arnold Schilder, 2002.
"Risk in Financial Conglomerates: Management and Supervision,"
Research Series Supervision (discontinued)
49, Netherlands Central Bank, Directorate Supervision.
- Iman van Lelyveld & Arnold Schilder, 2003. "Risk in Financial Conglomerates: Management and Supervision," Finance 0301006, EconWPA.
- de Luna Martinez, Jose & Rose, Thomas A., 2003. "International survey of integrated financial sector supervision," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3096, The World Bank.
- Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer, 2001. "Supervision of large complex banking organizations," Federal Reserve Bulletin, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), issue Feb, pages 47-57.
- Richard K. Abrams & Michael W Taylor, 2000. "Issues in the Unification of Financial Sector Supervision," IMF Working Papers 00/213, International Monetary Fund.
- Nicolás Majluf & Nureya Abarca & Darío Rodríguez & Luis Arturo Fuentes, 1998. "Governance And Ownership Structure In Chilean Economic Groups," Abante, Escuela de Administracion. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile., vol. 1(1), pages 111-139.
- Andrew Kuritzkes & Til Schuermann & Scott M. Weiner, 2002. "Risk Measurement, Risk Management and Capital Adequacy in Financial Conglomerates," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 03-02, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Franklin Allen & Richard Herring, 2001. "Banking Regulation versus Securities Market Regulation," Center for Financial Institutions Working Papers 01-29, Wharton School Center for Financial Institutions, University of Pennsylvania.
- Gregory E. Elliehausen, 1998. "The cost of banking regulation: a review of the evidence," Staff Studies 171, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
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