A Simple Approach for Organizing Behavior and Explaining Cooperation in Repeated Games
We introduce a novel approach for organizing behavior and explaining cooperation in repeated games. Our approach is based on the idea that players differ according to an inherent propensity to cooperate that systematically affects behavior and cooperation levels. We formulate the empirical implications of this idea and test them in the lab. Our data support our approach. Our main conclusions are: (i) players' strategies in a repeated game can be ranked along a single dimension, (ii) this ranking remains stable across repeated games, and (iii) the composition of a group, in terms of its players' propensities, strongly affects cooperation levels.
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|Date of creation:||May 2011|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Box 844000, Richmond, VA 23284-4000|
Web page: http://www.business.vcu.edu/economics
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- Feinberg, Robert M & Husted, Thomas A, 1993. "An Experimental Test of Discount-Rate Effects on Collusive Behaviour in Duopoly Markets," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(2), pages 153-160, June.
- Aoyagi, Masaki & Fréchette, Guillaume, 2009. "Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(3), pages 1135-1165, May.
- Urs Fischbacher, 2007. "z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 10(2), pages 171-178, June.
- ENGLE-WARNICK, Jim & McCAUSLAND, William J. & MILLER, John H., 2004.
"The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior,"
Cahiers de recherche
15-2004, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- ENGLE-WARNICK, Jim & McCAUSLAND, William J. & MILLER, John H., 2004. "The Ghost in the Machine: Inferring Machine-Based Strategies from Observed Behavior," Cahiers de recherche 2004-11, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Martin J Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2009.
"A Course in Game Theory,"
814577000000000225, UCLA Department of Economics.
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