State and Local Climate Policy under a National Emissions Floor
This paper describes the nature of inter-jurisdictional relations as they may exist under a federal cap-and-trade program and provides background on the current climate-related activities by state and local governments. State and local governments are uniquely positioned to implement many aspects of an overall climate strategy, and an important question is whether the price signal from a cap-and-trade program (or a tax) would be a sufficient incentive to do so. The paper examines alternative types of relationships between different levels of government when an agency problem exists, wherein information or incentives for action are not perfectly aligned.
|Date of creation:||14 Mar 2008|
|Note:||This mirrors a file published as a Resources for the Future discussion paper: RFF DP 09-54 Pub. data: December 2009 URL: http://www.rff.org/rff/documents/rff-dp-09-54.pdf|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: P.O. Box 400206|
Web page: http://www.coopercenter.org/econ
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Richard A. Posner, 1974.
"Theories of Economic Regulation,"
NBER Working Papers
0041, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:vac:wpaper:wp08-05. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (William M. Shobe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.