Monetary Policy Transparency and Uncertainty: A Comparison between the Bank of England and the Bundesbank/ECB
It is widely believed that institutional arrangements influence the quality of monetary policy outcomes. Judged on its ‘transparency’ characteristics, therefore the Bank of England should do better than the Bundesbank/ECB. We show that this is not confirmed by agents’ ability to anticipate central bank decisions. Furthermore, benefits from transparency should also show in a narrowing of the diversity in cross sectional forecasts. We show that the diversity in interest rate forecasts is no greater under the Bundesbank/ECB than the Bank of England. This suggests that other factors than ‘transparency’ may affect interest rate uncertainty. Increasing difficulty in forecasting inflation appears to play a part in the UK while being less of a problem in Germany.
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