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Mixed Matching Markets

Author

Listed:
  • Winfried Hochstättler

  • Robert Nickel

  • David Schiess

Abstract

We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes stable marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further generalization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander [2]. We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n4).

Suggested Citation

  • Winfried Hochstättler & Robert Nickel & David Schiess, 2008. "Mixed Matching Markets," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2008 2008-10, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    • Handle: RePEc:usg:dp2008:2008-10
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    File URL: http://ux-tauri.unisg.ch/RePEc/usg/dp2008/DP-10-Sc.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986. "Multi-Item Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-872, August.
    2. Roth, Alvin E. & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1996. "Stable Outcomes in Discrete and Continuous Models of Two-Sided Matching: a Unified Treatment," Brazilian Review of Econometrics, Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria - SBE, vol. 16(2), November.
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