Mixed Matching Markets
We introduce a new model for two-sided markets that generalizes stable marriages as well as assignment games. Our model is a further generalization of the model introduced by Eriksson and Karlander . We prove that the core of our model is always non-empty by providing an algorithm that determines a stable solution in O(n4).
|Date of creation:||Apr 2008|
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- Demange, Gabrielle & Gale, David & Sotomayor, Marilda, 1986.
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 863-72, August.
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