Contractual Implications of International Trade in Tacit Knowledge
This paper searches for evidence on the additional difficulty the parties have in contracting for the transfer of know-how relative to the transfer of patented technology. There is empirical evidence, drawn from a sample of contracts for the acquisition of technology by Spanish firms in 1991, that contracts scheduled to last shorter are less likely to include the transfer of know-how. It is also found that technical assistance is bundled together with the transfer of know-how, so as to mitigate opportunistic behavior on the sellers side.
|Date of creation:||01 May 2004|
|Publication status:||Published, Applied Economics, 2007, vol. 39: pp. 1173-1183|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.unav.edu/web/facultad-de-ciencias-economicas-y-empresariales|
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