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The Importance of Tacit Knowledge: Dynamic Inventor Activity in the Commercialization Phase

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  • Maurseth, Per Botolf
  • Svensson, Roger

Abstract

Inventors generally know more about their inventions than what is written down in patent applications. Because they possess this tacit knowledge, inventors may need to play an active role when patents are commercialized. We build on Arora (1995) and model firm-inventor cooperation in the commercialization of a given invention. Tacit knowledge warrants inventor activity. However, imperfect IPRs may reduce inventors’ incentives to engage in the commercialization process. We analyze when first-best inventor activity is achieved in a two-stage contract. In the empirical part, we analyze when inventor activity is important for the successful commercialization of patents by using a detailed patent database. The database contains unique information on inventor activity, patent commercialization modes and the profitability of commercialization. In the empirical estimations, we find that inventor activity has a strong positive correlation with profitability when a patent is sold or licensed to another firm. When a patent is sold or licensed in the second phase, it is still inventor activity in the first phase that matters for profitability. Thus, our interpretation is that tacit knowledge and close cooperation between inventors and external firms are often crucial for the successful commercialization of patents.

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  • Maurseth, Per Botolf & Svensson, Roger, 2020. "The Importance of Tacit Knowledge: Dynamic Inventor Activity in the Commercialization Phase," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 49(7).
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:respol:v:49:y:2020:i:7:s0048733320300913
    DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2020.104012
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    Cited by:

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    4. Bangjuan Wang & Weisheng Mao & Junxian Piao & Chengliang Liu, 2023. "Does external linkage stimulate innovation capacity? The analysis based on “dual‐pipelines” framework," Papers in Regional Science, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 102(3), pages 613-633, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Tacit knowledge; Inventor activity; Patents; Commercialization;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes
    • O34 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Intellectual Property and Intellectual Capital

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