Alert the Inert? Switching Costs and Limited Awareness in Retail Electricity Markets
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Other versions of this item:
- Luisa Dressler & Stefan Weiergraeber, 2023. "Alert the Inert? Switching Costs and Limited Awareness in Retail Electricity Markets," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 15(1), pages 74-116, February.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Karle, Heiko & Schumacher, Heiner & Vølund, Rune, 2023.
"Consumer loss aversion and scale-dependent psychological switching costs,"
Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 138(C), pages 214-237.
- Heiko Karle & Heiner Schumacher & Rune Vølund, 2021. "Consumer Loss Aversion and Scale-Dependent Psychological Switching Costs," CESifo Working Paper Series 9313, CESifo.
- Christina Gravert, 2024. "From Intent to Inertia: Experimental Evidence from the Retail Electricity Market," CESifo Working Paper Series 11139, CESifo.
- Gibbard, Peter & Grubb, Cameron & Wesselbaum, Dennis, 2025. "Cost pass-through in the retail electricity market: Vertically integrated versus independent retailers," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 145(C).
More about this item
JEL classification:
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
- L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
- L94 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Electric Utilities
- L98 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Government Policy
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