IDEAS home Printed from
   My bibliography  Save this paper

An R&D Investment Game under Uncertainty in Real Option Analysis


  • Giovanni Villani



One of the problems of using the financial options methodolgy to analyse investment decisions is that strategic considerations become extremely important. So, the theory of real option games combines two successful theories, namely real options and game theory. The value of flexibility can be valued as a real option while the competition can be analyzed with game theory. In our model we develop an interaction between two firms that invest in R&D. The firm that invests first, defined as the Leader, acquires a first mover advantage that we assume as a higher share of market. But the R&D investments present positive externalities and so, the option exercise by the Leader generates an Information Revelation that benefits the Follower.

Suggested Citation

  • Giovanni Villani, 2006. "An R&D Investment Game under Uncertainty in Real Option Analysis," Quaderni DSEMS 10-2006, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
  • Handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:10-2006

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL:
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Carr, Peter P, 1988. " The Valuation of Sequential Exchange Opportunities," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 43(5), pages 1235-1256, December.
    2. S. Illeris & G. Akehurst, 2001. "Introduction," The Service Industries Journal, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 21(1), pages 1-4, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item


    Real Options; Exchange Options; Option games; Information Revelation.;

    JEL classification:

    • C70 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - General
    • G14 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies; Insider Trading
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:


    Access and download statistics


    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ufg:qdsems:10-2006. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Luca Grilli). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.