Opportunism in Sequential Investment Settings: On Holdups and Holdouts
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsHoldup problem; holdout problem; non-salvageable investments; eminent domain; contracts; vertical integration;
- D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
- K11 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Property Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
- L23 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Organization of Production
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2014-04-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-GER-2014-04-11 (German Papers)
- NEP-LAW-2014-04-11 (Law & Economics)
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