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Three-agent Peer Evaluation

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  • Vicki Knoblauch

    (University of Connecticut)

Abstract

I show that every rule for dividing a dollar among three agents impartially (so that each agent's share depends only on her evaluation by her associates) underpays some agent by at least one-third of a dollar for some consistent profile of evaluations. I then produce an impartial division rule that never underpays or overpays any agent by more than one-third of a dollar, and for most consistent evaluation profiles does much better.

Suggested Citation

  • Vicki Knoblauch, 2008. "Three-agent Peer Evaluation," Working papers 2008-28, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:uct:uconnp:2008-28
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    File URL: http://web2.uconn.edu/economics/working/2008-28.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Moulin, Herve & Tideman, Nicolaus, 2008. "Impartial division of a dollar," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 176-191, March.
    2. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    3. T. Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2008. "Paying the partners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 19-37, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Boudreau, James W. & Knoblauch, Vicki, 2011. "Dividing profits three ways: Exactness vs. consensuality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 79-86, September.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    division function; impartial; consensual;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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