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Three-agent peer evaluation

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  • Knoblauch, Vicki

Abstract

I present a rule that divides a dollar among three agents impartially (so that each agent's share depends only on her evaluation by her associates) while remaining as respectful as possible of consistent evaluation profiles.

Suggested Citation

  • Knoblauch, Vicki, 2009. "Three-agent peer evaluation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 312-314, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:105:y:2009:i:3:p:312-314
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Thomson, William, 2003. "Axiomatic and game-theoretic analysis of bankruptcy and taxation problems: a survey," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 249-297, July.
    2. T. Tideman & Florenz Plassmann, 2008. "Paying the partners," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 136(1), pages 19-37, July.
    3. de Clippel, Geoffroy & Moulin, Herve & Tideman, Nicolaus, 2008. "Impartial division of a dollar," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 139(1), pages 176-191, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Arthur Carvalho & Kate Larson, 2012. "Sharing Rewards Among Strangers Based on Peer Evaluations," Decision Analysis, INFORMS, vol. 9(3), pages 253-273, September.
    2. Shiran Rachmilevitch, 2022. "Reasonable Nash demand games," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 93(2), pages 319-330, September.
    3. Boudreau, James W. & Knoblauch, Vicki, 2011. "Dividing profits three ways: Exactness vs. consensuality," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 79-86, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Division function Impartial Consensual;

    JEL classification:

    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement

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