Legislative Bargaining and Incremental Budgeting
The notion of 'incrementalism', formulated by Aaron Wildavsky in the 1960's, has been extremely influential in the public budgeting literature. In essence, it entails the claim that legislators engaged in budgetary policymaking accept past allocations, and decide only on the allocation of increments to revenue. Wildavsky explained incrementalism with reference to the cognitive limitations of lawmakers and their desire to reduce conflict. This paper uses a legislative bargaining framework to undertake a formal analysis of incremental budgeting. An exogenously chosen agenda setter proposes budgets and seeks to build coalitions to secure passage, over multiple periods. The central result is that the agenda setter can lower her cost of building a winning coalition, and thereby raise her payoff, by following an incrementalist strategy, which involves maintaining the same coalition every period. First, it is shown within a simple 2-period model that there exist subgame perfect 'incremental budgeting' equilibria of this nature. If the agenda setter is assumed to be able to commit to the 'grandfathering' of past allocations, the unique subgame perfect equilibrium (up to the choice of the coalition members) involves incremental budgeting. The model is then extended to an infinitely repeated setting, and it is shown that the agenda setter's incentives for incremental budgeting are reinforced in this context. Some testable implications (relating incrementalism to various characteristics of the legislature) are also derived. Finally, the implications for incrementalism of heterogeneity among legislators are analyzed.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2002|
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- Roger B. Myerson, 1992. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities under Alternative Electoral Systems," Discussion Papers 1000, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 2000.
"Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies,"
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Elsevier, vol. 94(1), pages 46-79, September.
- Daniel Diermeier & Antonio Merlo, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Discussion Papers 1232, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998. "Government turnover in parliamentary democracies," Bulletins 7453, University of Minnesota, Economic Development Center.
- Diermeier, Daniel & Merlo, Antonio, 1998. "Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies," Working Papers 98-31, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- Leblanc, William & Snyder, James Jr. & Tripathi, Micky, 2000. "Majority-rule bargaining and the under provision of public investment goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(1), pages 21-47, January.
- Crain, W. Mark & Crain, Nicole Verrier, 1998. "Fiscal consequences of budget baselines," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 421-436, March.
- Dharmapala, Dhammika, 1999. "Comparing tax expenditures and direct subsidies: the role of legislative committee structure," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 421-454, June.
- Brian Knight, 2004. "Bargaining in Legislatures: An Empirical Investigation," NBER Working Papers 10530, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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