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Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers

Author

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  • Carmelo Rodríguez à lvarez

    (ICAE Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico, Depto. Análisis Económico y Economía Cuantitativa, Universidad Complutense de Madrid)

Abstract

We study social choice functions that select sets of alternatives, taking voters' preferences over sets as input, when voters evaluate sets according to conditional expected utility obtained from Bayesian updating of a prior. Barberà et al. (2001) shows that under a uniform common prior both dictatorial and bidictatorial rules satisfy strategy-proofness and unanimity. We show that this multiplicity is a knife-edge case. If at most one voter holds a uniform initial prior, dictatorship is the unique rule satisfying these properties. The argument links set-valued rules to random dictatorship and shows that the probability ratios imposed by Bayesian updating from non-uniform priors are incompatible with combining the top choices of multiple voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmelo Rodríguez à lvarez, 2026. "Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2026-02, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:2602
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/140346
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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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