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Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers

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  • Carmelo Rodríguez à lvarez

    (Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico (ICAE), Universidad Complutense de Madrid (Spain))

Abstract

We analyze strategy-proof rules that select sets of alternatives based on voters’ preferences over those sets. Sets of alternatives represent social choices pending a final resolution and voters are expected utility maximizers that assign probabilities to alternatives within each set using Bayesian updating from a common prior probability assessment. If there are at least three alternatives, then, for generic priors, only dictatorial rules are strategy-proof and unanimous. However, when the prior probability assessment assigns equal probability to all alternatives, strategyproofness also permits rules that select the set of best elements determined by two fixed voters.

Suggested Citation

  • Carmelo Rodríguez à lvarez, 2025. "Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2025-07, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucm:doicae:2507
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14352/126067
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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