Report NEP-DES-2025-12-01

This is the archive for NEP-DES, a report on new working papers in the area of Economic Design. Guillaume Haeringer issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.

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Other reports in NEP-DES

The following items were announced in this report:

• Sukanya Kudva & Anil Aswani, 2025. "Collusion-proof Auction Design using Side Information," Papers 2511.12456, arXiv.org, revised Dec 2025.
• Minoru Kitahara & Hiroshi Uno, 2025. "Complete Exchange Mechanisms," Papers 2511.11278, arXiv.org.
• Francis Bloch & Bhaskar Dutta & Marcin Dziubi'nski, 2025. "Peer Selection with Friends and Enemies," Papers 2511.11157, arXiv.org.
• Eric Gao & Eric Tang, 2025. "Private From Whom? Minimal Information Leakage in Auctions," Papers 2511.10349, arXiv.org.
• Carmelo Rodríguez à lvarez, 2025. "Strategy-Proof Social Choice Correspondences for Conditional Expected Utility Maximizers," Documentos de Trabajo del ICAE 2025-07, Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Instituto Complutense de Análisis Económico.
• Georgy Artemov & Kentaro Tomoeda, 2025. "Zoned Out: The Long-Term Consequences of School Choice for Wealth Segregation," Papers 2511.09967, arXiv.org.
• Yu-Ting Ho, 2025. "Matching Under Preference Uncertainty: Random Allocation, Informativeness, and Welfare," Papers 2511.09988, arXiv.org.
• Deryugina, Tatyana & Zaldokas, Alminas & Fedyk, Anastassia & Gorodnichenko, Yuriy & Hodson, James & Sologoub, Ilona, 2025. "Rating Government Procurement Markets," IZA Discussion Papers 18257, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
• Itai Arieli & Colin Stewart, 2025. "Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment," Working Papers tecipa-808, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.