Strategy-proof Choice of Acts : A Preliminary Study
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- SPRUMONT, Yves, 2016. "Strategy-proof choice of acts: a preliminary study," Cahiers de recherche 2016-06, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywordssocial choice under uncertainty; strategy-proofness; subjective expected utility;
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2016-07-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2016-07-09 (Game Theory)
- NEP-MIC-2016-07-09 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2016-07-09 (Utility Models & Prospect Theory)
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