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Un'analisi economica della partecipazione ai referendum abrogativi


  • Ricciuti, Roberto



In questo lavoro viene analizzata la partecipazione dei cittadini ai referendum abrogativi con particolare riferimento a quattro possibili determinati. I risultati mostrano che i referendum distributivi hanno una partecipazione al voto maggiore di quella dei referendum di efficienza; maggiore è la percentuale di elettori che si riconoscono nei partiti che sostengono l'astensione, minore è la percentuale di votanti. Inoltre i referendum votati in giugno presentano una minore partecipazione. Il numero di referendum votati contemporaneamente non ha effetti sulla percentuale di votanti fino ad un numero di quattro. A partire da questa analisi si discutono alcune proposte di riforma. In this paper we analyse four determinants of turnout in petition referendums. We find that distributive referendums have higher turnout than efficiency referendums; the higher the percentage obtained by parties campaigning for abstention, the lower turnout. Furthermore, referendums held in June show significantly less voters than in other months. The number of referendums voted simultaneously has not effect on turnout up to four referendums. Starting from these results we discuss possible reforms.

Suggested Citation

  • Ricciuti, Roberto, 2007. "Un'analisi economica della partecipazione ai referendum abrogativi," POLIS Working Papers 81, Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS.
  • Handle: RePEc:uca:ucapdv:81

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    1. repec:cup:apsrev:v:68:y:1974:i:02:p:525-536_11 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Amrita Dhillon & Susana Peralta, 2002. "Economic Theories Of Voter Turnout," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages 332-352, June.
    3. John G. Matsusaka, 1992. "Economics of Direct Legislation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 541-571.
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    JEL classification:

    • P48 - Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - Political Economy; Legal Institutions; Property Rights; Natural Resources; Energy; Environment; Regional Studies

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