Un’analisi economica della partecipazione ai referendum abrogativi
In this paper we analyse four determinants of turnout in petition referendums. We find that distributive referendums have higher turnout than efficiency referendums; the higher the percentage obtained by parties campaigning for abstention, the lower turnout. Furthermore, referendums held in June show significantly less voters than in other months. The number of referendums voted simultaneously has no effect on turnout up to four referendums. Starting from these results we discuss possible reforms.
Volume (Year): 96 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (July-August)
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- John G. Matsusaka, 1992. "Economics of Direct Legislation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(2), pages 541-571.
- Amrita Dhillon & Susana Peralta, 2002.
"Economic Theories Of Voter Turnout,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(480), pages F332-F352, June.
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