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Maastricht: New and Old Rules

  • Franco Spinelli
  • Carmine Trecroci

Thanks to the Maastricht Treaty and similar arrangements, central banks nowadays enjoy considerable independence. This is generally believed to be the result of relatively recent debates, which led to the conclusion that sheltering monetary authorities from the pressures of fiscal policymakers is a prerequisite for monetary stability. However, in history this point has in fact been a recurrent tenet. We start with David Ricardo's arguments in favour of central bank independence and against monetisation of public deficits. After WWI, the latter issue was at the heart of the 1920 International Financial Conference of the League of Nations, which fostered and guided the establishment of many new central banks, and shaped various policymaking arrangements of today's monetary authorities.

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Paper provided by University of Brescia, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number ubs0614.

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Date of creation: 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ubs:wpaper:ubs0614
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  1. DETKEN Carsten & SMETS Frank, . "Asset Price Booms and Monetary Policy," EcoMod2003 330700042, EcoMod.
  2. Tavelli, Henry & Tullio, Giuseppe & Spinelli, Franco, 1998. "The Evolution of European Central Bank Independence: An Updating of the Masciandaro and Spinelli Index," Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society, vol. 45(3), pages 341-44, August.
  3. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521443159 is not listed on IDEAS
  4. Claudio E. V. Borio & Philip Lowe, 2004. "Securing sustainable price stability: should credit come back from the wilderness?," BIS Working Papers 157, Bank for International Settlements.
  5. repec:cup:cbooks:9780521023450 is not listed on IDEAS
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