The College Choice Problem with Priorities
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More about this item
Keywords
Matching; Preference; Priority; Coherence; Fairness; Mechanism;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles
- D47 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Market Design
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EDU-2013-01-26 (Education)
- NEP-GTH-2013-01-26 (Game Theory)
- NEP-LAB-2013-01-26 (Labour Economics)
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