Optimal Liquidity Management and Hedging in the presence of a non predictable investment opportunity
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Other versions of this item:
- Villeneuve, Stéphane & Warin, Xavier, 2012. "Optimal Liquidity Management and Hedging in the presence of a non predictable investment opportunity," IDEI Working Papers 694, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
References listed on IDEAS
- Thomas W. Bates & Kathleen M. Kahle & René M. Stulz, 2009.
"Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash than They Used To?,"
Journal of Finance,
American Finance Association, vol. 64(5), pages 1985-2021, October.
- Thomas W. Bates & Kathleen M. Kahle & Rene M. Stulz, 2006. "Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash Than They Used To?," NBER Working Papers 12534, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Bates, Thomas W. & Kahle, Kathleen M. & Stulz, Rene M., 2007. "Why Do U.S. Firms Hold So Much More Cash Than They Used To?," Working Paper Series 2006-17, Ohio State University, Charles A. Dice Center for Research in Financial Economics.
- Julien Hugonnier & Semyon Malamud & Erwan Morellec, 2015.
"Capital Supply Uncertainty, Cash Holdings, and Investment,"
Review of Financial Studies,
Society for Financial Studies, vol. 28(2), pages 391-445.
- Julien HUGONNIER & Semyon MALAMUD & Erwan MORELLEC, "undated". "Capital Supply Uncertainty, Cash Holdings, and Investment," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 11-44, Swiss Finance Institute.
- Bjarne Hø jgaard & Michael Taksar, 1999. "Controlling Risk Exposure and Dividends Payout Schemes:Insurance Company Example," Mathematical Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 9(2), pages 153-182.
More about this item
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
- G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- G35 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Payout Policy
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