Optimal Use of Rewards as Commitment Device When Bidding is Costly
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References listed on IDEAS
- Kaplan, Todd & Sela, Aner, 2003. "Auctions with Private Entry Costs," CEPR Discussion Papers 4080, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gal, Shmuel & Landsberger, Michael & Nemirovski, Arkadi, 2007. "Participation in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 75-103, July.
- Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar, 2008.
"Procurement with costly bidding, optimal shortlisting, and rebates,"
Elsevier, vol. 98(3), pages 327-334, March.
- Fan, Cuihong & Wolfstetter, Elmar G., 2006. "Procurement with Costly Bidding, Optimal Shortlisting, and Rebates," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 166, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
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KeywordsProcurement; auctions; industrial organization; mechanism design;
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
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