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Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness


  • Hitoshi Matsushima

    (Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo)


We investigate implementation of social choice functions as mappings from states to lotteries under complete information. We assume that for every agent, any pair of distinct states induces distinct preferences. A social choice function is called Condorcet-decisive if it always enforces the Condorcet winner among its range. We introduce plurality mechanisms, where each agent makes a single announcement and the lottery associated with the opinion announced by the largest number of agents is enforced. We show that a social choice function is virtually implementable via plurality mechanisms combined with constrained random dictatorship, if and only if it is Condorcet-decisive.

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  • Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Plurality Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Condorcet-Decisiveness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-148, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
  • Handle: RePEc:tky:fseres:2002cf148

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1988. "A new approach to the implementation problem," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 45(1), pages 128-144, June.
    2. Matthew O. Jackson, 1992. "Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 757-775.
    3. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Stability and Implementation via Simple Mechanisms in the Complete Information Environments," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-147, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
    4. JoseHerrero, Maria & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1992. "Implementation via backward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 70-88, February.
    5. Abreu, Dilip & Matsushima, Hitoshi, 1992. "Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 993-1008, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Hitoshi Matsushima, 2002. "Direct Mechanisms, Virtual Implementation, and Majority-Proofness," CIRJE F-Series CIRJE-F-149, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.

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