A Differential Approach to Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
Numerous simple proofs of the celebrated Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard, 1977, Satterthwaite, 1975) has been given in the literature. These are based on a number of different intuitions about the most fundamental reason for the result. In this paper we derive the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem once more, this time in a differentiable environment using the idea of potential games (Rosenthal, 1973, Monderer and Shapley, 1996). Our proof is very different from those that have been given previously.
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- Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
- Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 70(3), pages 381-385, March.
- Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
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