IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/tiu/tiutis/77912e04-373f-4bd4-a1b9-bc223bb330b2.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Economics of Shallow Lakes

Author

Listed:
  • Mäler, K-G.
  • Xepapadeas, A.
  • de Zeeuw, A.J.

    (Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management)

Abstract

Ecological systems such as shallow lakes areusually non-linear and display discontinuitiesand hysteresis in their behaviour. Thesesystems often also provide conflicting servicesas a resource and a waste sink. This impliesthat the economic analysis of these systemsrequires to solve a non-standard optimalcontrol problem or, in case of a commonproperty resource, a non-standard differentialgame. This paper provides the optimalmanagement solution and the open-loop Nashequilibrium for a dynamic economic analysis ofthe model for a shallow lake. It alsoinvestigates whether it is possible to induceoptimal management in case of common use of thelake, by means of a tax. Finally, some remarksare made on the feedback Nash equilibrium. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 2003
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Mäler, K-G. & Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A.J., 2000. "The Economics of Shallow Lakes," Other publications TiSEM 77912e04-373f-4bd4-a1b9-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:77912e04-373f-4bd4-a1b9-bc223bb330b2
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/ws/portalfiles/portal/536227/69.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Tsutsui, Shunichi & Mino, Kazuo, 1990. "Nonlinear strategies in dynamic duopolistic competition with sticky prices," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 136-161, October.
    2. Frederick Ploeg & Aart Zeeuw, 1992. "International aspects of pollution control," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 2(2), pages 117-139, March.
    3. Paul Krugman, 1991. "History versus Expectations," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 651-667.
    4. Brock, William A. & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2002. "The repeated lake game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 109-114, June.
    5. Dockner Engelbert J. & Van Long Ngo, 1993. "International Pollution Control: Cooperative versus Noncooperative Strategies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 25(1), pages 13-29, July.
    6. Monderer, Dov & Shapley, Lloyd S., 1996. "Potential Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 124-143, May.
    7. Kiminori Matsuyama, 1991. "Increasing Returns, Industrialization, and Indeterminacy of Equilibrium," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 106(2), pages 617-650.
    8. Skiba, A K, 1978. "Optimal Growth with a Convex-Concave Production Function," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(3), pages 527-539, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Wirl, Franz, 2016. "Indeterminacy and history dependence of strategically interacting players," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 145(C), pages 19-24.
    2. Akihiko Yanase & Ngo Van Long & Ngo Van Long, 2020. "Trade Costs and Strategic Investment in Infrastructure in a Dynamic Global Economy with Symmetric Countries," CESifo Working Paper Series 8707, CESifo.
    3. Karp, Larry S. & Tsur, Yacov, 2007. "Climate Policy When the Distant Future Matters: Catastrophic Events with Hyperbolic Discounting," CUDARE Working Papers 7186, University of California, Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
    4. Engelbert Dockner & Florian Wagener, 2014. "Markov perfect Nash equilibria in models with a single capital stock," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 56(3), pages 585-625, August.
    5. Bård Harstad, 2016. "The Dynamics of Climate Agreements," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 719-752.
    6. Niko Jaakkola & Florian Wagener & Florian O.O. Wagener, 2023. "Differential Games of Public Investment: Markovian Best Responses in the General Case," CESifo Working Paper Series 10585, CESifo.
    7. Oyama, Daisuke, 2009. "Agglomeration under forward-looking expectations: Potentials and global stability," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(6), pages 696-713, November.
    8. Kossioris, G. & Plexousakis, M. & Xepapadeas, A. & de Zeeuw, A. & Mäler, K.-G., 2008. "Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1312-1331, April.
    9. Zhang, Junxi, 2000. "Public services, increasing returns, and equilibrium dynamics," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 227-246, February.
    10. Zhang, J., 1998. "Global behaviour of a system with imperfect private-public substitutability," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(3), pages 437-454, March.
    11. Antoci, Angelo & Galeotti, Marcello & Russu, Paolo, 2011. "Poverty trap and global indeterminacy in a growth model with open-access natural resources," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(2), pages 569-591, March.
    12. Karp, Larry & Tsur, Yacov, 2011. "Time perspective and climate change policy," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 1-14, July.
    13. Azariadis, Costas & Stachurski, John, 2005. "Poverty Traps," Handbook of Economic Growth, in: Philippe Aghion & Steven Durlauf (ed.), Handbook of Economic Growth, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 5, Elsevier.
    14. Philip L. Brock, 2009. "Collateral Constraints and Macroeconomic Adjustment in an Open Economy," Working Papers UWEC-2009-03, University of Washington, Department of Economics.
    15. Santiago J. Rubio, 2002. "On The Coincidence Of The Feedback Nash And Stackelberg Equilibria In Economic Applications Of Differential Games," Working Papers. Serie AD 2002-11, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    16. Oyama, Daisuke, 2009. "History versus expectations in economic geography reconsidered," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 33(2), pages 394-408, February.
    17. Larry S. Karp, 2012. "Provision of a Public Good with Altruistic Overlapping Generations and Many Tribes," CESifo Working Paper Series 3895, CESifo.
    18. Wirl, Franz & Feichtinger, Gustav, 2005. "History dependence in concave economies," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 390-407, August.
    19. Driskill, Robert, 2006. "Multiple equilibria in dynamic rational expectations models: A critical review," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 171-210, January.
    20. Zagonari, Fabio, 1998. "International Pollution Problems: Unilateral Initiatives by Environmental Groups in One Country," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 46-69, July.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:tiu:tiutis:77912e04-373f-4bd4-a1b9-bc223bb330b2. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Richard Broekman (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.tilburguniversity.edu/about/schools/economics-and-management/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.