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Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version)

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Schaling, E.

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Discussion Paper 1993-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a26d2af2-01f7-4f0f-b2e9-3309b8881354
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    1. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
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    4. Jakob De Haan & Jan Egbert Sturm, 1992. "The Case for Central Bank Independence," Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 45(182), pages 305-327.
    5. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Other publications TiSEM 0401b17a-e2c7-4179-ace9-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Funke, Norbert, 1992. "Wage formation and monetary policy rules," Kiel Working Papers 514, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
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    8. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    9. Weintraub, Robert E., 1978. "Congressional supervision of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 341-362, April.
    10. Alex Cukierman, 1986. "Central bank behavior and credibility: some recent theoretical developments," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 5-17.
    11. Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-325, August.
    12. Stanley Fischer, 1986. "Editorial in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 3-8, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Robert Mundell, 1963. "Inflation and Real Interest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 280-280.
    14. Kenneth Rogoff, 1985. "The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 100(4), pages 1169-1189.
    15. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    16. Alberto Alesina & Vittorio Grilli, 1991. "The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe," NBER Working Papers 3860, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-630, October.
    18. Mascaro, Angelo & Meltzer, Allan H., 1983. "Long- and short-term interest rates in a risky world," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 485-518, November.
    19. Olivier Jean Blanchard & Stanley Fischer, 1989. "Lectures on Macroeconomics," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262022834, December.
    20. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-239, May.
    21. Stanley Fischer, 1986. "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number fisc86-1, March.
    22. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Kwabi, Frank O. & Boateng, Agyenim & Du, Min, 2020. "Impact of central bank independence and transparency on international equity portfolio allocation: A cross-country analysis," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 69(C).
    2. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "Optimal commitment in an open economy : Credibility vs. flexibility," Discussion Paper 1995-79, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
    4. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1997. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 53-79, February.
    5. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
    6. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1994. "Goals, guidelines and constraints facing monetary policymakers: proceedings of a conference held at North Falmouth, Massachusetts in June 1994," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38.
    7. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 397-411, July.
    8. Damir Piplica & Ivo Speranda & Zvonimir Josip Perkovic, 2018. "Some Aspects of Actual CBI and Inflation in the Countries of Southeast Europe," Montenegrin Journal of Economics, Economic Laboratory for Transition Research (ELIT), vol. 14(2), pages 41-57.
    9. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The ultimate determinants of central bank independence," Other publications TiSEM 08ac747d-531c-4bee-8a47-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    10. Solveen, Ralph, 1995. "Zentralbankpolitik und Zentralbankautonomie: Spielt die Unabhängigkeit eine Rolle?," Kiel Working Papers 710, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).

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    Keywords

    Game Theory; Central Banks;

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