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Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version)

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  • Eijffinger, S.C.W.

    (Tilburg University, Center For Economic Research)

  • Schaling, E.

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1993. "Central bank independence : Theory and evidence (Revised version)," Discussion Paper 1993-25, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:tiu:tiucen:a26d2af2-01f7-4f0f-b2e9-3309b8881354
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    File URL: https://pure.uvt.nl/portal/files/1149960/SCWEES5621912.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Canzoneri, Matthew B, 1985. "Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(5), pages 1056-1070, December.
    2. Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
    3. Stock, James H & Watson, Mark W, 1988. "Variable Trends in Economic Time Series," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 147-174, Summer.
    4. Funke, Norbert, 1992. "Wage formation and monetary policy rules," Kiel Working Papers 514, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    5. Eijffinger, S.C.W., 1993. "Central bank independence in twelve industrial countries," Other publications TiSEM 0401b17a-e2c7-4179-ace9-a, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    6. Gray, Jo Anna, 1976. "Wage indexation: A macroeconomic approach," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 2(2), pages 221-235, April.
    7. Cukierman, Alex & Meltzer, Allan H, 1986. "A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1099-1128, September.
    8. Alesina, Alberto & Tabellini, Guido, 1987. "Rules and Discretion with Noncoordinated Monetary and Fiscal Policies," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 25(4), pages 619-630, October.
    9. Blackburn, Keith & Christensen, Michael, 1989. "Monetary Policy and Policy Credibility: Theories and Evidence," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 27(1), pages 1-45, March.
    10. Mascaro, Angelo & Meltzer, Allan H., 1983. "Long- and short-term interest rates in a risky world," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(4), pages 485-518, November.
    11. Weintraub, Robert E., 1978. "Congressional supervision of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 341-362, April.
    12. Alex Cukierman, 1986. "Central bank behavior and credibility: some recent theoretical developments," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, issue May, pages 5-17.
    13. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-239, May.
    14. Havrilesky, Thomas M, 1987. "A Partisanship Theory of Fiscal and Monetary Regimes," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 19(3), pages 308-325, August.
    15. Stanley Fischer, 1986. "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number fisc86-1, January.
    16. Stanley Fischer, 1986. "Editorial in "NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, "," NBER Chapters,in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 1986, Volume 1, pages 3-8 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Robert Mundell, 1963. "Inflation and Real Interest," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 71, pages 280-280.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Sylvester Eijffinger & Eric Schaling, 1995. "Optimal Commitment in an Open Economy: Credibility vs. Flexibility," Bank of England working papers 41, Bank of England.
    2. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1998. "Monetary union without fiscal coordination may discipline policymakers," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 239-258, August.
    3. Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, 1994. "How independent should a central bank be?," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38, pages 195-225.
    4. Beetsma, Roel M. W. J. & Lans Bovenberg, A., 1997. "Designing fiscal and monetary institutions in a second-best world," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 53-79, February.
    5. Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, 1994. "Goals, guidelines and constraints facing monetary policymakers: proceedings of a conference held at North Falmouth, Massachusetts in June 1994," Conference Series ; [Proceedings], Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, vol. 38.
    6. Eijffinger, Sylvester C W & Hoeberichts, Marco, 1998. "The Trade off between Central Bank Independence and Conservativeness," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 50(3), pages 397-411, July.
    7. Solveen, Ralph, 1995. "Zentralbankpolitik und Zentralbankautonomie: Spielt die Unabhängigkeit eine Rolle?," Kiel Working Papers 710, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW).
    8. Eijffinger, S.C.W. & Schaling, E., 1995. "The ultimate determinants of central bank independence," Discussion Paper 1995-5, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Game Theory; Central Banks;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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