The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe
This paper studies how the creation of a European Central Bank (ECB) will change the political economy of monetary policy in Europe. The twelve governors of the national Central Banks of the EEC have recently proposed a statute for the ECB which delineates its institutional structure. In this paper, we discuss the likely consequences of this statute on the conduct of monetary policy at the European level, particularly from the point of view of the trade-off between inflation and stabilization. We analyze the role of political independence of the ECB and the effect of voting rules for the appointments of the ECB board members on policy choices.
|Date of creation:||Oct 1991|
|Publication status:||published as in Canzoneri, M., V. Grilli and P. Masson (eds.) "Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S." Cambridge University Press, 1992. pages 49-76|
|Note:||ITI ME IFM|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.|
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- repec:fth:harver:1496 is not listed on IDEAS
- Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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