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Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures

Author

Listed:
  • Stefano Ficco

    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

  • Vladimir Karamychev

    (Faculty of Economics, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam)

Abstract

We consider a hierarchical organization with two fully rational agents. The goal of the organization is that of selecting the best alternative out of several available, and agents are heterogenous in the accuracy with which they screen the alternatives. We show that, if internal communications between agents is not possible, the ordering of agents affects the performance of the organization. More specifically, we find that the expected payoff of the organization improves when the more accurate agent screens first. Finally, we note that such optimal ordering makes the hierarchy formally identical to one in which the internal communication flow is perfect.

Suggested Citation

  • Stefano Ficco & Vladimir Karamychev, 2005. "Evaluation Problem versus Selection Problem in Organizational Structures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 05-058/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    • Handle: RePEc:tin:wpaper:20050058
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. George W. J. Hendrikse, 1992. "Competition Between Architectures," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 25-26, pages 39-50.
    2. Koh Winston T. H., 1992. "Variable evaluation costs and the design of fallible hierarchies and polyarchies," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 313-318, March.
    3. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-727, September.
    4. Koh, Winston T. H., 1992. "Human fallibility and sequential decision making : Hierarchy versus polyarchy," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 317-345, August.
    5. Stefano Ficco & Vladimir A. Karamychev, 2004. "Information Overload in Multi-Stage Selection Procedures," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-077/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    6. Koh, Winston T. H., 1993. "First-mover advantage and organizational structure," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 43(1), pages 47-52.
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    8. Koh, Winston T. H., 1994. "Making decisions in committees a human fallibility approach," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(2), pages 195-214, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organizations; Imperfect Communication; Selection;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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