Heterogeneity, electoral rules and the number of candidates: an empirical investigation using a quasi-natural experiment
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Laurent Bouton, 2013.
"A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 103(4), pages 1248-1288, June.
- Laurent Bouton, 2012. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series WP2012-001, Boston University - Department of Economics.
- Laurent Bouton, 2013. "A Theory of Strategic Voting in Runoff Elections," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/160854, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
More about this item
Keywordsrunoff; heterogeneity; number of candidates;
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- E - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics
- D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-11-11 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2012-11-11 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-POL-2012-11-11 (Positive Political Economics)
StatisticsAccess and download statistics
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spa:wpaper:2012wpecon25. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Pedro Garcia Duarte). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/deuspbr.html .