Deterministic Equations for Stochastic Spatial Evolutionary Games
Spatial evolutionary games model individuals who are distributed in a spa- tial domain and update their strategies upon playing a normal form game with their neighbors. We derive integro-differential equations as deterministic ap- proximations of the microscopic updating stochastic processes. This generalizes the known mean-field ordinary differential equations and provide a powerful tool to investigate the spatial effects in populations evolution. The determin- istic equations allow to identify many interesting features of the evolution of strategy profiles in a population, such as standing and traveling waves, and pattern formation, especially in replicator-type evolutions.
|Date of creation:||Apr 2010|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: |
Web page: http://home.sogang.ac.kr/sites/sgrime
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Schelling, Thomas C, 1969. "Models of Segregation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(2), pages 488-93, May.
- John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, June.
- H. Peyton Young & Mary A. Burke, 2001. "Competition and Custom in Economic Contracts: A Case Study of Illinois Agriculture," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 559-573, June.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sgo:wpaper:1004. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (In Choi)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.