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Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX

Author

Listed:
  • Samuel Garrido

    (Departament d'Economia, Universitat Jaume I. Castellón (Spain))

Abstract

By custom, in several different regions of Europe tenants were the owners of the improvements they carried out on the farm. As a result of such customs, rents usually remained below the Ricardian equilibrium over long periods of time and therefore cannot be used to calculate the total factor productivity in agriculture. This paper examines the logic underlying the functioning of the custom that came into being in nineteenth-century Valencia. This is followed by a brief comparison between the Valencia custom, the Irish tenant right and the French mauvais gré.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Garrido, 2010. "Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX," Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria 1009, Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria.
    • Handle: RePEc:seh:wpaper:1009
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Samuel Garrido & Salvador Calatayud, 2011. "The price of improvements: agrarian contracts and agrarian development in nineteenth‐century eastern Spain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(2), pages 598-620, May.
    2. Guinnane, Timothy W. & Miller, Ronald I., 1996. "Bonds without Bondsmen: Tenant-Right in Nineteenth-Century Ireland," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 113-142, March.
    3. Garrido, Samuel, 2011. "Fixed-rent contracts and investment incentives. A comparative analysis of English tenant right," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 66-82, January.
    4. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, February.
    5. Allen, Robert C, 1982. "The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 937-953, December.
    6. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911.
    7. Samuel Garrido Herrero & Salvador Calatayud Giner, 2007. "La compra silenciosa. Arrendamientos, estabilidad y mejoras en la agricultura valenciana de regadío (1850-1930)," Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research (IHE-EHR), Journal of the Spanish Economic History Association, Asociación Española de Historia Económica, vol. 8, pages 77-108.
    8. McCloskey, Donald N., 1991. "The Prudent Peasant: New Findings on Open Fields," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(2), pages 343-355, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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