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Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX

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  • Samuel Garrido

    () (Departament d'Economia, Universitat Jaume I. Castellón (Spain))

Abstract

By custom, in several different regions of Europe tenants were the owners of the improvements they carried out on the farm. As a result of such customs, rents usually remained below the Ricardian equilibrium over long periods of time and therefore cannot be used to calculate the total factor productivity in agriculture. This paper examines the logic underlying the functioning of the custom that came into being in nineteenth-century Valencia. This is followed by a brief comparison between the Valencia custom, the Irish tenant right and the French mauvais gré.

Suggested Citation

  • Samuel Garrido, 2010. "Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX," Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria 1009, Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria.
  • Handle: RePEc:seh:wpaper:1009
    as

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    File URL: http://repositori.uji.es/xmlui/bitstream/handle/10234/18093/DT%20Garrido%20B.pdf?sequence=1
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Guinnane, Timothy W. & Miller, Ronald I., 1996. "Bonds without Bondsmen: Tenant-Right in Nineteenth-Century Ireland," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(01), pages 113-142, March.
    2. Barzel,Yoram, 1997. "Economic Analysis of Property Rights," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521597135, May.
    3. Allen, Robert C, 1982. "The Efficiency and Distributional Consequences of Eighteenth Century Enclosures," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 92(368), pages 937-953, December.
    4. McCloskey, Donald N., 1991. "The Prudent Peasant: New Findings on Open Fields," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 51(02), pages 343-355, June.
    5. Garrido, Samuel, 2011. "Fixed-rent contracts and investment incentives. A comparative analysis of English tenant right," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 66-82, January.
    6. Samuel Garrido Herrero & Salvador Calatayud Giner, 2007. "La compra silenciosa. Arrendamientos, estabilidad y mejoras en la agricultura valenciana de regadío (1850-1930)," Investigaciones de Historia Económica (IHE) Journal of the Spanish Economic History Association, Asociacion Espa–ola de Historia Economica, vol. 8, pages 77-108.
    7. Samuel Garrido & Salvador Calatayud, 2011. "The price of improvements: agrarian contracts and agrarian development in nineteenth‐century eastern Spain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(2), pages 598-620, May.
    8. Eggertsson,Thrainn, 1990. "Economic Behavior and Institutions," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521348911, May.
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    Cited by:

    1. Samuel Garrido, 2011. "Las instituciones de riego en la España del este. Una reflexión a la luz de la obra de Elinor Ostrom," Historia Agraria. Revista de Agricultura e Historia Rural, Sociedad Española de Historia Agraria, issue 53, pages 13-42, april.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    tenants; improvements; property rights; Valencia; mauvais gré;

    JEL classification:

    • N53 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: Pre-1913
    • N54 - Economic History - - Agriculture, Natural Resources, Environment and Extractive Industries - - - Europe: 1913-
    • Q15 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture - - - Land Ownership and Tenure; Land Reform; Land Use; Irrigation; Agriculture and Environment
    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights

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