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Fixed-rent contracts and investment incentives. A comparative analysis of English tenant right

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  • Garrido, Samuel

Abstract

This article stresses that tenants are more motivated to improve the holding when they have formal property rights over their improvements. In this case, however, their rights over the improvements usually come into conflict with the landlords' rights over the land. Through a comparison with what happened elsewhere in Europe, the article analyses the attempts to delineate and ensure both rights in nineteenth-century England. No wholly satisfactory solution was found to the problem and the article concludes that this is one of the reasons explaining the poor performance of English agriculture in the early twentieth century.

Suggested Citation

  • Garrido, Samuel, 2011. "Fixed-rent contracts and investment incentives. A comparative analysis of English tenant right," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 66-82, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:exehis:v:48:y:2011:i:1:p:66-82
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Samuel Garrido & Salvador Calatayud, 2011. "The price of improvements: agrarian contracts and agrarian development in nineteenth‐century eastern Spain," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 64(2), pages 598-620, May.
    2. Brasselle, Anne-Sophie & Gaspart, Frederic & Platteau, Jean-Philippe, 2002. "Land tenure security and investment incentives: puzzling evidence from Burkina Faso," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 67(2), pages 373-418, April.
    3. Quy-Toan Do & Lakshmi Iyer, 2008. "Land Titling and Rural Transition in Vietnam," Economic Development and Cultural Change, University of Chicago Press, vol. 56(3), pages 531-579, April.
    4. Offer, Avner, 1991. "The First World War: An Agrarian Interpretation," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198202790.
    5. Guinnane, Timothy W. & Miller, Ronald I., 1996. "Bonds without Bondsmen: Tenant-Right in Nineteenth-Century Ireland," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 56(1), pages 113-142, March.
    6. O'Rourke, Kevin H., 2007. "Property rights, politics and innovation: creamery diffusion in pre-1914 Ireland," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 11(3), pages 395-417, December.
    7. Alston, Lee J & Libecap, Gary D & Schneider, Robert, 1996. "The Determinants and Impact of Property Rights: Land Titles on the Brazilian Frontier," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 12(1), pages 25-61, April.
    8. Basu, Kaushik, 1992. "Limited liability and the existence of share tenancy," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 203-220, January.
    9. Samuel Garrido Herrero & Salvador Calatayud Giner, 2007. "La compra silenciosa. Arrendamientos, estabilidad y mejoras en la agricultura valenciana de regadío (1850-1930)," Investigaciones de Historia Económica - Economic History Research (IHE-EHR), Journal of the Spanish Economic History Association, Asociación Española de Historia Económica, vol. 8, pages 77-108.
    10. Alston, Lee J. & Higgs, Robert, 1982. "Contractual Mix in Southern Agriculture since the Civil War: Facts, Hypotheses, and Tests," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(2), pages 327-353, June.
    11. Besley, Timothy, 1995. "Property Rights and Investment Incentives: Theory and Evidence from Ghana," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 103(5), pages 903-937, October.
    12. Allen, Robert C., 2008. "The Nitrogen Hypothesis and the English Agricultural Revolution: A Biological Analysis," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 68(1), pages 182-210, March.
    13. F. M. L. Thompson, 1968. "The Second Agricultural Revolution, 1815–1880," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 21(1), pages 62-77, April.
    14. Shetty, Sudhir, 1988. "Limited liability, wealth differences and tenancy contracts in agrarian economies," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 1-22, July.
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    1. Samuel Garrido, 2017. "The fruit of inequality: wine, efficiency, agrarian contracts and property rights in Catalonia (1898-1935)," Documentos de Trabajo (DT-AEHE) 1701, Asociación Española de Historia Económica.
    2. Donna, Javier & Espin Sanchez, Jose, 2014. "Let the Punishment Fit the Criminal," MPRA Paper 67003, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Samuel Garrido, 2010. "Mejorar y quedarse. La cesión de tierra a rentas por debajo del equilibrio en la Valencia del siglo XIX," Documentos de Trabajo de la Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria 1009, Sociedad de Estudios de Historia Agraria.

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