Firms have incentives to invest in wage reducing practices when they expect a high advertising equilibrium in the future product market competition. Incentives to invest in wage reducing practices like shifting the production to the third world or lobbying legislators to change labor market regulation by lowering the bargaining power of workers, can be explained by a link between the product market and labor market which operates through the effect of advertising on demand. Increased advertising implies under general conditions more production and therefore greater incentives to reduce production costs per unit.
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