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Fiscal or Bailout Union: Where Is the EU/EMU’s Fiscal Integration Heading?

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  • Marek Dabrowski

Abstract

The European debt crisis triggered a debate on the lacking components of the EU and EMU integration architecture. Many believe that a common currency requires closer fiscal and political integration as a condition for its survival. This opinion is not necessarily supported by the experience of other monetary unions, especially those created by sovereign states. On the other hand, the current EU integration architecture already contains several elements of fiscal union. Furthermore, in several important policy areas such as financial supervision, defense, security, border protection, foreign policy, environmental protection, and climate change, the centralization of tasks and resources at the Union level could offer increasing returns to scale and a better chance to address pan-European externalities. This applies to the entire EU, not only to the Eurozone. Each variant of fiscal integration must be based on sound foundations of fiscal discipline. Market discipline, i.e., the danger of sovereign default, supplemented by clear and consistently enforced fiscal rules is the best solution to this problem. Unfortunately, since 2010, the ‘no bail out’ principle has been replaced by a policy of conditional bailout of governments in fiscal trouble. Some proposals, such as Eurobonds or the lender of last resort to governments, go even further in this direction, and threaten to build a dysfunctional fiscal union.

Suggested Citation

  • Marek Dabrowski, 2013. "Fiscal or Bailout Union: Where Is the EU/EMU’s Fiscal Integration Heading?," CASE Network Studies and Analyses 0466, CASE-Center for Social and Economic Research.
  • Handle: RePEc:sec:cnstan:0466
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael D. Bordo & Lars Jonung & Agnieszka Markiewicz, 2013. "A Fiscal Union for the Euro: Some Lessons from History ," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo Group, vol. 59(3), pages 449-488, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Ludek Kouba & Michal Madr & Danuse Nerudova & Petr Rozmahel, 2016. "Policy Autonomy, Coordination or Harmonization in the Persistently Heterogeneous European Union?," DANUBE: Law and Economics Review, European Association Comenius - EACO, issue 1, pages 53-71, March.
    2. Tatiana COVALSCHI & Lilia ROTARU, 2015. "The European Union’S General Budget- An Instrument For Economic Governance," CES Working Papers, Centre for European Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, vol. 7(2a), pages 407-419, September.
    3. Ludek Kouba & Michal Mádr & Danuše Nerudová & Petr Rozmahel, 2015. "Policy Autonomy, Coordination or Harmonisation in the Persistently Heterogeneous European Union? WWWforEurope Working Paper No. 95," WIFO Studies, WIFO, number 58136.
    4. Ionel Leonida, 2015. "Structural Trends in Romanian Tax System in the Context of the Tax Good Governance in the European Union," Social-Economic Debates, Association for Entreprenorial Spirit Promotion, vol. 4(2), pages 1-10, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary Union; Common Currency; Fiscal Union; European Union; Eurozone; EU Budget; Fiscal Federalism; Fiscal Discipline;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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