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Predatory Governance

Listed author(s):
  • Dalida Kadyrzhanova

This paper argues that imperfect corporate control is a determinant of market structure. We integrate a widely accepted version of the separation of ownership and control -- Jensen's (1986) 'empire-building' hypothesis -- into a dynamic oligopoly model. Our main observation is that, due to product market competition, shareholders face an endogenous opportunity cost of governance. We derive shareholders' optimal governance choices and show analytically that governance has a first-order effect on firms' dynamic incentives and leads to increasing dominance and predation. Through numerical simulations we demonstrate that imperfect corporate control has a sizable adverse impact on market structure and consumer welfare. It results in low turnover, high concentration, persistently monopolized markets, and low industry-wide investment. As a consequence, consumer welfare is significantly - up to thirty percent - lower than in otherwise identical industries with full corporate control. These results suggest a role for public policy toward corporate governance as an effective pro-competitive tool.

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File URL: http://repec.org/sce2005/up.15357.1107233869.pdf
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Paper provided by Society for Computational Economics in its series Computing in Economics and Finance 2005 with number 421.

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Date of creation: 11 Nov 2005
Handle: RePEc:sce:scecf5:421
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