Equilibrium Properties of Finite Binary Choice Games
This paper derives a complete characterization for the equilibrium properties of a binary choice interaction model with a finite number of agents - in particular the correspondence between the interaction strength, the number of agents, and the set of equilibria. For the class of games considered, the results may prove to be useful in developing efficient algorithms for finding all equilibria
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- Milgrom, Paul & Roberts, John, 1990. "Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1255-1277, November.
- Abhijit V. Banerjee, 1992. "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 107(3), pages 797-817.
- Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-877, October.
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