Blocking and Accepting Steering from Ministers and Departments. Coping Strategies of Agencies in Flanders
This article analyzes the relationships that exist between semi-autonomous agencies, departments and ministers. In theory, agencies have a significant amount of autonomy. However, in practice, this autonomy seems to be hollowed out by both ministers and departments. Politicians no longer are committed to agencification reform in Flanders and attempt to re-centralize. Departments hold a bureaucratic mentality and treat agencies as being lower in rank. However, what emerges from the findings discovered here is that agencies do not accept this passively. Over time, they have developed tactics to ensure their own autonomy. They depict departments as being incompetent and untrustworthy, and even manage to bypass them. Due to the low-level interest of ministers, they manage to shape the reform to their own objectives. These problems can be best described using theories of trust. This analysis suggests that both structural and contextual factors create distrust between agencies, departments and ministers.
|Date of creation:||Jan 2007|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Hoveniersberg 4, B-9000 Gent|
Phone: ++ 32 (0) 9 264 34 61
Fax: ++ 32 (0) 9 264 35 92
Web page: http://www.ugent.be/eb
More information through EDIRC
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Colin Talbot, 2004. "Executive Agencies: Have They Improved Management in Government?," Public Money & Management, Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy, vol. 24(2), pages 104-112, 04.
- J. Rommel & J. Christiaens & C. Devos, 2005. "Rhetorics of Reform : The Case of New Public Management as a Paradigm Shift," Working Papers of Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, Ghent University, Belgium 05/354, Ghent University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rug:rugwps:07/431. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Nathalie Verhaeghe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.