IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/rtv/ceisrp/598.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Should I Share or Should I Not? On the Sharing of Information on Past Performance in Procurement

Author

Listed:

Abstract

Many real-world public-sector purchases involve a combination of verifiable and non-verifiable dimensions of quality, leading to a classical incomplete-contracting problem. This paper analyses how public buyers may use debarment lists — in essence, blacklists of under-performing contractors — to incentivize quality provision in repeated procurement tenders. A key question is whether debarment lists should be shared among multiple agencies or maintained separately. Sharing multiplies the punishment for bad performance (an under-performing firm loses access to all agencies, not just one), which might strongly deter shirking. However, this paper shows that sharing debarment lists backfires when mistakes may occur in judging quality ex-post: if one agency erroneously penalizes a cooperative contractor, that error propagates to every agency, potentially discouraging contractors from exerting high quality in the first place. By modelling repeated interactions and allowing for observational errors, we show the implicit costs stemming from a shared debarment list, and draw policy lessons for designing blacklists in public procurement.

Suggested Citation

  • Gian Luigi Albano & Walter Ferrarese & Alberto Iozzi & Roberto Pezzuto, 2025. "Should I Share or Should I Not? On the Sharing of Information on Past Performance in Procurement," CEIS Research Paper 598, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 29 Apr 2025.
  • Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:598
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://ceistorvergata.it/RePEc/rpaper/RP598.pdf
    File Function: Main text
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Public procurement; Relational contracts; Unverifiable quality; Debarment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:598. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Barbara Piazzi (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/csrotit.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.