On Income Inequality and Green Preferences
We derive conditions on individual preferences and technology that give rise to a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental protection. We present a class of models (which captures a static model as well as an overlapping-generations model) in which individuals differ in earning abilities, and where a majority elected representative takes decisions over a pollution tax and a redistributive tax. We show that, if private consumption goods and the environment are non-inferior goods, then if the decisive individual has lower ability than the average, she will prefer a higher redistributive tax and a lower pollution tax.
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