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Improvement of Mechanisms of State Regulation of the Russian Grain Market
[Совершенствование Механизмов Государственного Регулирования Российского Рынка Зерна]


  • Uzun, Vasily (Узун, Василий)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Svetlov, Nikolai (Светлов, Николай)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Shagaida, Natalia (Шагайда, Наталья)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Loginova, Daria (Логинова, Дарья)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))

  • Shishkina, Ekaterina (Шишкина, Екатерина)

    (Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA))


Basing on the analysis of Russian and foreign practices of grain market regulation and computer experiments on the imitation model of the Russian wheat market, the paper proposes the reasons why the measures to regulate the Russian grain market did not reach, as a rule, the goals set forth in the Law on Agricultural Development adopted in 2006. Proposals for improving regulatory mechanisms are justified. The most important of them: commodity and procurement interventions should be carried out according to the rules established by law and according to pre-approved, and not at current exchange prices; It is advisable to regulate commodity and procurement interventions in the grain market using rules that are transparent to the market and allow independent monitoring of their implementation; The formula for annual specification of borders of a price corridor is offered. In the process of improving the system of regulation of the national grain market, it is suggested to follow a strategy aimed at moving in the long term from the system of commodity and purchasing interventions to the system of compensation for price losses similar to that introduced in the United States in 2014.

Suggested Citation

  • Uzun, Vasily (Узун, Василий) & Svetlov, Nikolai (Светлов, Николай) & Shagaida, Natalia (Шагайда, Наталья) & Loginova, Daria (Логинова, Дарья) & Shishkina, Ekaterina (Шишкина, Екатерина), 2017. "Improvement of Mechanisms of State Regulation of the Russian Grain Market [Совершенствование Механизмов Государственного Регулирования Российского Рынка Зерна]," Working Papers 051736, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration.
  • Handle: RePEc:rnp:wpaper:051736

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2008. "Contracts as Reference Points," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 123(1), pages 1-48.
    2. Gafarova, Gulmira & Perekhozhuk, Oleksandr & Glauben, Thomas, 2015. "Price Discrimination And Pricing-To-Market Behavior Of Black Sea Region Wheat Exporters," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 47(3), pages 287-316, August.
    3. Robert G. Chambers & Richard E. Just, 1981. "Effects of Exchange Rate Changes on U.S. Agriculture: A Dynamic Analysis," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 63(1), pages 32-46.
    4. Hart, Oliver, 1995. "Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198288817.
    5. Ludo Peters, 1990. "EC Feed Grain Spatial Equilibrium Model for Policy Analysis, An," Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) Publications (archive only) 90-wp61, Center for Agricultural and Rural Development (CARD) at Iowa State University.
    6. Vassily Uzun & Valery Saraikin & Ekaterina Gataulina & Natalia Shagayda & Renata Yanbykh & Sergio Gomez y Paloma & Sébastien Mary, 2014. "Prospects of the farming sector and rural development in view of food security: the case of the Russian Federation," JRC Working Papers JRC85162, Joint Research Centre (Seville site).
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    Cited by:

    1. Peter Shnurkov & Daniil Novikov, 2018. "Analysis of the problem of intervention control in the economy on the basis of solving the problem of tuning," Papers 1811.10993,

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