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Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem

Author

Listed:
  • Landeo, Claudia

    () (University of Alberta, Department of Economics)

  • Spier, Kathryn

    () (Harvard Law School)

Abstract

Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of o fferor typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unfair and ineffcient outcomes occur with an unassigned o fferor. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.

Suggested Citation

  • Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2013. "Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem," Working Papers 2013-10, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:ris:albaec:2013_010
    as

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    File URL: https://sites.ualberta.ca/~econwps/2013/wp2013-10.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Vincent P. Crawford, 1977. "A Game of Fair Division," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 44(2), pages 235-247.
    2. María-Angeles de Frutos & Thomas Kittsteiner, 2008. "Efficient partnership dissolution under buy-sell clauses," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 39(1), pages 184-198.
    3. Che, Yeon-Koo & Hendershott, Terrence, 2008. "How to divide the possession of a football?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 561-565, June.
    4. Richard R. W. Brooks & Claudia M. Landeo & Kathryn E. Spier, 2010. "Trigger happy or gun shy? Dissolving common-value partnerships with Texas shootouts," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 41(4), pages 649-673.
    5. Marchand, Joseph, 2012. "Local labor market impacts of energy boom-bust-boom in Western Canada," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, pages 165-174.
    6. Landeo, Claudia & Spier, Kathryn, 2013. "Irreconcilable Differences: Judicial Resolution of Business Deadlock," Working Papers 2013-9, University of Alberta, Department of Economics.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Business Deadlock; Shotgun Mechanisms; Asymmetric Information; Experiments;

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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