IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this paper

How to Divide the Possession of a Football?

Author Info

Listed author(s):
  • Che, Yeon-Koo
  • Hendershott, Terrence

Abstract

The current National Football League overtime rule favors the team starting on offense. Auctioning off or dividing-and-choosing the starting possession can potentially restore ex post fairness. We find auctions to provide a better outcome when teams have asymmetric information.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6103/1/MPRA_paper_6103.pdf
File Function: original version
Download Restriction: no

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 6103.

as
in new window

Length:
Date of creation: 2006
Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6103
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Ludwigstraße 33, D-80539 Munich, Germany

Phone: +49-(0)89-2180-2459
Fax: +49-(0)89-2180-992459
Web page: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de

More information through EDIRC

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:
  • Z1 - Other Special Topics - - Cultural Economics
  • D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.

as
in new window


Cited by:

  1. Kendall, Graham & Lenten, Liam J.A., 2017. "When sports rules go awry," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 257(2), pages 377-394.
  2. Jose Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2010. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2548-2564, December.
  3. Landeo, Claudia M. & Spier, Kathryn E., 2013. "Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: The unassigned-offeror problem," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 121(3), pages 390-394.
  4. Brown, Alexander L. & Velez, Rodrigo A., 2016. "The costs and benefits of symmetry in common-ownership allocation problems," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 115-131.
  5. Jianpei Li & Yi Xue & Weixing Wu, 2013. "Partnership dissolution and proprietary information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 40(2), pages 495-527, February.
  6. Brams, Steven J. & Ismail, Mehmet S., 2016. "Making the Rules of Sports Fairer," MPRA Paper 69714, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  7. Yeon-Koo Che & Erin Cho, 2011. "Brave New World of Market Design," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 27, pages 33-56.

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Access and download statistics

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:6103. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Joachim Winter)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.