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The Strategic Response of Banks to an Exogenous Positive Information Shock in the Credit Markets

  • Mannonen, Pekka
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    File URL: http://www.etla.fi/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/dp830.pdf
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    Paper provided by The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy in its series Discussion Papers with number 830.

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    Length: 16 pages
    Date of creation: 2002
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:rif:dpaper:830
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    1. Steven A. Sharpe, 1989. "Asymmetric information, bank lending, and implicit contracts: a stylized model of customer relationships," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 70, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    2. Arnoud W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, 2000. "Can Relationship Banking Survive Competition?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 679-713, 04.
    3. Leland, Hayne E & Pyle, David H, 1977. "Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 32(2), pages 371-87, May.
    4. Spence, A Michael, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 87(3), pages 355-74, August.
    5. Bouckaert, J.M.C. & Degryse, H.A., 2001. "Borrower Poaching and Information Display in Credit Markets," Discussion Paper 2001-41, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    6. Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1992. "The Commitment of Finance, Duplicated Monitoring and the Investment Horizon," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0027, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
    7. Milton Harris & Bengt Holmstrom, 1981. "A Theory of Wage Dynamics," Discussion Papers 488, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    8. Mannonen, Pekka, 2001. "Advancing information technology and financial intermediation," Discussion Papers 770, The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy.
    9. Diamond, Douglas W, 1991. "Monitoring and Reputation: The Choice between Bank Loans and Directly Placed Debt," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(4), pages 689-721, August.
    10. Holmstrom, Bengt & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and the Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 112(3), pages 663-91, August.
    11. van Damme, E.E.C., 1994. "Banking : A survey of recent microeconomic theory," Other publications TiSEM e40b271e-7c74-4215-af3d-8, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Chiesa Gabriella, 1995. "Proprietary Information, Financial Intermediation, and Research Incentives," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 4(4), pages 328-357, October.
    13. Bhattacharya Sudipto & Thakor Anjan V., 1993. "Contemporary Banking Theory," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 3(1), pages 2-50, October.
    14. Manove, Michael & Padilla, Atilano Jorge & Pagano, Marco, 2000. "Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks," CEPR Discussion Papers 2439, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    15. Ramon Caminal & Carmen Matutes, 2002. "Can competition in the credit market be excessive?," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 527.02, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    16. Mayer, Colin, 1994. "The Assessment: Money and Banking: Theory and Evidence," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(4), pages 1-13, Winter.
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