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Justicia de Mano Propia: Un Experimento de Castigos de Terceros

Author

Listed:
  • Mendoza, Freddy
  • Restrepo-Plaza, Lina

Abstract

Las continuas fallas en las instituciones formales para la administración de la justicia han promovido el desarrollo de instituciones informales basadas en la generación de castigos en manos privadas. Esta investigación propende por evaluar el rol de la solidaridad, la indignación y la venganza en el proceso de toma de decisiones de sancionar. Con tal propósito, hemos realizado un experimento basado en el trust game con dos adaptaciones: incorporando el cheap talk y la posibilidad de castigo. En nuestro diseño experimental manipulamos, cuidadosamente, la presencia de castigo, quién castiga y la estructura de pagos de los jugadores. Encontramos que la probabilidad de castigo y las decisiones de inversión no se ven modificadas por nuestros tratamientos, sin embargo, sí modifica las actitudes recíprocas. Concretamente, identificamos que la posibilidad de que un agente ejecute una sanción motivada por la venganza inhibe las actitudes egoístas de quienes pueden apropiarse de las ganancias de la inversión, pero la indignación y la solidaridad no parecen surtir ningún efecto.

Suggested Citation

  • Mendoza, Freddy & Restrepo-Plaza, Lina, 2020. "Justicia de Mano Propia: Un Experimento de Castigos de Terceros," Working papers 61, Red Investigadores de Economía.
  • Handle: RePEc:rie:riecdt:61
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Reciprocidad; Confianza; Castigo de terceros; Experimento de laboratorio; Juego de confianza;

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
    • F51 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Conflicts; Negotiations; Sanctions

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