Unintended Impacts of Multiple Instruments on Technology Adoption
There are many situations where environmental authorities use a mix of environmental policy instruments, rather than one single instrument, to address environmental concerns. For example, one instrument may be used to reduce overall emissions of a pollutant while another is used to address specific seasonal concerns. Very little work has been done on the economic impacts of the application of multiple instruments. This paper investigates the unintended impacts of the interaction of a tradable permits scheme with direct seasonal regulations on the rate of adoption of advanced abatement technologies.
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- Till Requate & Wolfram Uunold, 2001. "On the Incentives Created by Policy Instruments to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology if Firms are Asymmetric," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 536-536, December.
- Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 95-111, January.
- Milliman, Scott R. & Prince, Raymond, 1989. "Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 247-265, November.
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