IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(200112)1574_536oticbp_2.0.tx_2-x.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

On the Incentives Created by Policy Instruments to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology if Firms are Asymmetric

Author

Listed:
  • Till Requate
  • Wolfram Uunold

Abstract

The paper investigates the incentives created by environmental policy instruments to adopt cleaner technology. In a framework with many asymmetric firms we show that, if the regulator has committed to a certain aggregate emission level before the new technology was available, taxes lead to overinvestment, while both auctioned and free permits lead to underinvestment. If, however, the regulator knows the new technology, he is able to induce the socially optimal degree of adoption independently of whether he moves before or after adoption.

Suggested Citation

  • Till Requate & Wolfram Uunold, 2001. "On the Incentives Created by Policy Instruments to Adopt Advanced Abatement Technology if Firms are Asymmetric," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 536-536, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200112)157:4_536:oticbp_2.0.tx_2-x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/mohr/jite/2001/00000157/00000004/art00004
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bengt Holmstrom & Jean Tirole, 1997. "Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The Real Sector," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, pages 663-691.
    2. Jung, Chulho & Krutilla, Kerry & Boyd, Roy, 1996. "Incentives for Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology at the Industry Level: An Evaluation of Policy Alternatives," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, pages 95-111.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    4. Kennedy, Peter W. & Laplante, Benoit, 2000. "Environmental policy and time consistency - emissions taxes and emissions trading," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2351, The World Bank.
    5. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Pollution permits and compliance strategies," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, pages 85-125.
    6. Biglaiser, Gary & Horowitz, John K & Quiggin, John, 1995. "Dynamic Pollution Regulation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, pages 33-44.
    7. Downing, Paul B. & White, Lawrence J., 1986. "Innovation in pollution control," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, pages 18-29.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(200112)157:4_536:oticbp_2.0.tx_2-x. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Thomas Wolpert). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohr.de/jite .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.