Optimal dynamic antitrust fines
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More about this item
Keywords
antitrust; cartel; differential games;JEL classification:
- K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-COM-2019-11-11 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-GTH-2019-11-11 (Game Theory)
- NEP-IND-2019-11-11 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-ORE-2019-11-11 (Operations Research)
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